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Statement of Jurisdiction
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3 (1953), as amended.

Issues Presented
Whether there was a search and seizure which violated Article I, Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when
police officers entered a home without a warrant in order to investigate a misdemeanor
violation?
Whether subsequent evidence and admissions should be suppressed if
discovered shortly after an illegal search and seizure?

Pertinent Constitutional Provisions
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution
4th Amendment to the United States Constitution

Statement of the Case
On January 1, 1993, a two car accident occurred in Orem. Trial transcript, p.
4. One of the cars, a full-size, brown Buick left the scene of the accident. Id The
police were notified and an officer Denton Johnston shortly arrived at the scene.
Suppression hearing transcript, p. 10. Officer Johnston radioed a request for other
units to begin looking for the missing automobile "due to the time delay." Suppression
hearing transcript, p. 11. Officer Steele was in the area and he eventually located a
vehicle matching the description and plate number given to him by Johnston and the
others involved in the accident. The vehicle was parked near an apartment complex.
1

Suppression hearing transcript, p. 13-14. Officer Steele examined the vehicle and
noticed the damage to the front of the car that matched the accident scene he had driven
past. Suppression hearing transcript, p. 14. The officer claimed that the door was not
closed tightly and that he could detect the smell of alcohol coming from the interior of
the vehicle. Suppression Hearing, p. 14.
Officer Steele did not know which apartment unit the owner of the vehicle lived
in, so he knocked on a door and asked the young lady that answered who owned the
damaged vehicle. Id He was told she lived in a downstairs unit and Officer Steele
knocked on the door of that unit. The apartment unit was dark and Officer Steele did
not receive any response to his knocking on the door. Suppression hearing transcript,
p. 15. After giving up on a response, Officer Steele found a purse on the stairs leading
to the door which he confiscated to protect it. Id Officer Steele proceeded to search
the purse. I d
At this point, Officer Jackson arrived on the scene and the two officers returned
to the apartment door. Suppression hearing transcript, p. 16. Officer Jackson reached
through a tear in the screen door and knocked on the actual apartment door.
Suppression hearing transcript, p. 16, 26. Again, there was no response, but the
interior apartment door swung open a few inches. Id The oficers observed that keys
were left inserted in the apartment door. Id
The officers then pushed the door open even further and then turned on
flashlights to illuminate the interior of the apartment. Suppression hearing transcript, p.
17, 26-27. The police saw a person sit up from a prone position in a back bedroom
and asked her for her name. After a response, both officers entered the house.
Suppression hearing transcript, p. 21. After entering the house, the officers began
asking the appellant questions. Suppression hearing transcript, p. 22. The officers
then asked the appellant to leave the apartment and the interrogation continued outside.

2

Suppression hearing transcript, p. 18. Thereafter, the appellant was taken to the police
station to take an intoxilyzer test and to receive her Miranda rights. Trial transcript, p.
23-24.

Summary of the Arguments
Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of Utah protects individuals from
unreasonable searches. Utah Courts have held this section of the Constitution to
require a warrant for a search of a home unless exigent circumstances prevent the police
from obtaining a warrant. In the present case, possible exceptions include hot pursuit,
destruction of evidence or injury to the appellant. Each of these exceptions fail and
therefore an unlawful search occurred when the police entered the appellants home
without a warrant and without an exigent circumstance to support the entry.
The remedy for a constitutional violation of article I, section 14 is the
suppression of evidence obtained by the unlawful act that is not too attenuated from the
wrongful police activity. Here, the trial court failed to suppress evidence obtained
during the illegal search. Therefore, the court erred in failing to suppress this evidence,
and the appellate court should reverse and remand this decision for a new trial without
the illegally obtained evidence.

Argument
On January 1, 1993, Orem City Police were engaged in a search for a vehicle
involved in an accident on a snowy day. Police Officer Terry Steele found the
automobile parked outside of an apartment complex. Following a brief investigation,
officer Steele, now accompanied by Police Officer Jackson, entered one of the
apartments without a warrant and without consent. The actions by these officers were a
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violation of the appellant's constitutional rights. The remedy for these violations
should be the suppression of the evidence garnered from the officer's illegal actions.

A.

THE POLICE VIOLATED ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF
THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION OR THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
TO
THE
UNITED
STATES
CONSTITUTION BY MAKING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH OF
A HOME WITHOUT A WARRANT.

Recently, the Utah appellate Courts have focused on the importance of "relying
on an analysis of the search and seizure provisions of their own constitutions to expand
or maintain constitutional protection beyond the scope mandated by the fourth
amendment." State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 465 (Utah 1990). This new emphasis
on the Utah State Constitution has focused the analysis for violations of this provision
on the State Constitution in preference to the United States Constitution. While section
14 and the Fourth Amendment are similar in nature and have historically been treated in
a similar manner, Larocco and other recent cases have altered the analysis for a Article I
Section 14 violation to a standard which is in many ways more strict and certainly more
understandable than the Federal counterpart.
Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of Utah reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
This section forbids unreasonable searches. Therefore, the a constitutional violation
has occurred where there is a search without a warrant and no reasonable exception
exists for exigent circumstances.

1.

A search took place when the police opened the door to the apartment.
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In order for the police to have violated the appellant's constitutional rights, a
search must have occurred. In State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), the
Utah Supreme Court held that the opening of an unlocked car door constituted a search
by the police . In support of this decision, the Court cited New York v. Class. 475
U.S. 106, 114-15 (1986). In Larocco. 794 P.2d at 471, this reasoning was extended
to apply to the Constitution of Utah. Therefore, under the Federal Constitution or the
State Constitution, the police engage in a search by opening a car door.
In the present case, the police slightly opened the door by knocking. While this
could be a search, a search definitely occurred when the police opened the door even
further and illuminated an interior room with a flashlight. Thereafter, the police actually
entered the home without a warrant and without consent or exigent circumstances.
Entry into the home is the chief evil against which the search and seizure clause is
directed. Payton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). If opening a car door
constitutes a search, opening the door to a home should be afforded the same
protection. Nevertheless, when the police entered the home a search occurred, and a
warrantless entry was made into the home. Therefore, a search occurred without a
warrant.

2.

Warrantless searches are not permitted unless there are exigent
circumstances.

According to Larocco. "warrantless searches will be permitted only where they
satisfy their traditional justification, namely to protect the safety of police or the public
or to prevent the destruction of evidence." Larocco. 794 P.2d at 469-70; see also
Chimel v. California. 394 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). Furthermore, "Warrantless
searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances require
action before a warrant can be obtained." Larocco. 794 P.2d at 470; State v.
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Christensen. 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984). The state carries the burden of showing
that a warrantless search was lawful. Id
The presumption that a warrantless search is unreasonable is particularly
difficult to overcome when the search is conducted in the defendant's home and where
a warrant can easily and quickly be obtained by the use of Utah's telephonic warrant
statute. In State v. Ramirez. 814 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah App. 1991), the Court of
Appeals held the burden is on the state to show both probable cause and exigent
circumstances. It seems apparent that the police had probable cause that an offense had
occurred at the time they reached the appellant's apartment for the hit-and-run offense.
Therefore, the appellant will focus her argument on whether exigent circumstances
existed to justify a warrantless entry.
Exigency exists which would justify a warrantless arrest in four different
circumstances. Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-2 (1990) states that when reasonable
cause exists, the police may make a warrantless arrest when there is reasonable cause to
believe that the person may flee, conceal evidence or injure another person. Another
exception exists when the police are in hot pursuit. Ramirez. 814 P.2d at 1134.
Importantly, application of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is
probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in this
case, has been committed." Welsh v. Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984). The
state can not possibly meet its burden as to any of these exceptions. Therefore, an
illegal search, seizure or arrest has occurred.
There is absolutely no evidence that the appellant would flee or injure anyone.
The appellant was at her home in her bed at the time the police made their illegal entry.
The police had located their suspect and had time to obtain a warrant when the appellant
did not answer the door, particularly when a telephonic warrant could have been
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obtained in minutes. Therefore, the only exceptions that have any merit at all are
concealing or destroying evidence and hot pursuit.
In Ramirez, the Court defined hot pursuit as an "immediate and continuous
pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of the crime." State v. Ramirez. 814 P.2d at
1134 citing Welsh v. Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740, 750-53 (1984). Here, the police did
not immediately follow the suspect. The police were not present when the crime
occurred, and the appellant was not continuously pursued from the scene. In fact, there
is absolutely no evidence to show that the appellant even knew the police were looking
for her. This is clearly not a hot pursuit case, and this exception to the warrant case is
inapplicable.
The only remaining exigent circumstance is concealment or destruction of
evidence. At the time of the warrantless entry, the police had already examined the
vehicle involved in the crash. The only other evidence possible would be a blood
alcohol level if the police had probable cause to suspect driving under the influence, or,
possibly an injury to the driver. However, several jurisdictions and the United States
Supreme Court have held that these are not sufficient exigent circumstances to
constitute an emergency even under the lower standard of the fourth amendment.
In State v. Geisler. 222 Conn. 672, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), police located a hit
and run driver at his home. The car door was ajar and the keys were in the
automobile's ignition. A screen door to the home was closed, but the inner door was
open. The police entered the home, found the defendant in his bed, and awoke him for
questioning. The police entered the home under the stated reason of possible injury.
The Connecticut Supreme Court held the trial court's factual findings "do not support
the conclusion that it was reasonable to believe that an emergency existed." In the
present case, the facts available to the police officers were minor damage to the car, the
key left in the ignition, the open car door and lack of response when the officers rang
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the doorbell, knocked on the door and windows and shouted through the screen." Id
at 1236. The facts precisely follow the facts in the instant case.
Connecticut is not alone in so holding. In People v. Krueger. 208 111. App. 3d
897, 567 N.E.2d 717 (1991), the court held that a warrantless entry could not be
justified where the police knew that the defendant had been involved in an accident. In
Lambert v. State. 745 P.2d 1185 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), the emergency doctrine
could not be used to support a warrantless entry even where the trial court found severe
damage to the automobile involved in an accident.
The Connecticut Court continued in its analysis to state that "even if the police
had been justified in initially entering the defendant's home, once they ascertained that
he was physically well, they should have withdrawn. Geisler. 610 A.2d at 1237. In
this case, the police entered the home and did not withdraw. Even if the Court
determines that the entry was justified because of a possible emergency situation, once
the appellant indicated she was fine, the police should have withdrawn. The police
action in this case was improper and a violation of the appellant's constitutional rights.
As to blood alcohol level, the United States Supreme Court has held that a
warrantless entry into a home "cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the
petitioner's blood alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a
warrant." Welsh. 466 U.S. at 754. Therefore, the police could not enter the home on
this basis alone even if the mere smell of alcohol eminating from the car created
probable cause that the driver was engaged in the crime of driving under the influence.
There is no emergency exception which justifies the warrantless entry into the
appellant's home. Therefore, the trial court's findings on these matters should be
reversed.
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B.

THE PROPER REMEDY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATIONS IS EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE WHICH IS
LINKED TO THE UNLAWFUL CONDUCT AND IS NOT
TOO ATTENUATED.

The Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that "exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 14."
Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472. The rule extends to oral statements as well as physical
evidence. "The general rule in a criminal proceeding is that statements and other
evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful warrantless arrest are suppressible if the
link between the evidence and the unlawful conduct is not too attenuated. I.N.S. v.
Lopez-Mendoza. 468 U.S. 1039, 1041 (1984) Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S.
471 (1963).
In the instant case, a constitutional violation has occurred. Therefore, the
evidence obtained by the police should have been suppressed. It was error on the part
of the trial court not to suppress the evidence obtained by the police in the appellants
home and her subsequent statements. All of the information obtained at that time
should be suppressed.
Conclusion
The police officers involved in this case violated the appellant's constitutional
rights by conducting a warrantless search, seizure and arrest without exigent
circumstances. The remedy for this type of unlawful action is suppression of evidence
obtained therefrom. The trial court committed reversible error by failing to suppress
this information. Therefore, the trial court's decision should be reversed and remanded
for a new trial without the evidence illegally obtained.
DATED this

of August, 1993.

wi

MicKael J. Petro^-—Attorney for Defendant
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UONSTTTUTION OF UTAH

JL*±

Sec. 14, [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing
to be seized.
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Controlled Substances Act, search warrants, § 58-37-10.

Liquor, search,
§ 32A-13-103.

seizure

and

forfeiture,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Administrative inspections and searches.
Automobile search.
—Inventory.
Blood samples.
City ordinance.
Consent to search.
—Who may consent.
Drugs.
Evidence voluntarily surrendered.
Exclusionary rule.
Hair samples.
Information used to support warrant.
Invalid search warrant.
Inventory search.
Juveniles.
Liquor.
Neutral and detached magistrate.
Particular description.
Plain view.
Private searches.
Probable cause.
—Veracity of witness.
Reasonable expectation of privacy.
Scope of search.
Search.
Search incident to arrest.
Search warrant.
—Validity.
Search without warrant.
—Delay before search.
—Propriety.
Standing to object to search.
—Stolen vehicle.
Stopping for criminal investigation.
Cited.
In general.
Neither under a subpoena duces tecum nor
under a motion to examine will an examination be permitted of a nature to contravene
provision against unreasonable searches and

seizures. Evans v. Evans, 98 Utah 189, 98 P.2d
703 (1940).
It is generally recognized that the legitimate
use of a search warrant is restricted to public
prosecutions, and in no event may such proceeding be invoked for the protection of a mere
private right. Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36,
110 P.2d 355 (1941).
It is use to which it is put that renders property, otherwise lawful and rightful to have, use
and possess, subject to seizure and forfeiture.
Hemenway & Moser Co. v. Funk, 100 Utah 72,
106 P.2d 779 (1940).
For general discussion of fourth amendment
to federal Constitution, see City of Price v.
Jaynes, 113 Utah 89, 191 P.2d 606 (1948).
Whether a search and seizure is reasonable
is to be determined by the trial court, and evidence in plain view of the officer pursuing a
felon may be rightfully seized and such seizure
is not a violation of the federal constitutional
protection as set forth in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081
(1961). State v. Allred, 16 Utah 41, 395 P.2d
535 (1964).
No illegal search and seizure occurred where
police went to defendant's apartment pursuant
to a tip, were voluntarily admitted by another
defendant, saw articles taken in burglary in
plain sight on kitchen table and were shown
other stolen merchandise willingly by defendant. State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73, 513 P.2d
435 (1973).
Where, although investigation was in its
preliminary stages, police officers realized
there was a possibility that defendant had committed rape and homicide that they were investigating, and feared that he might try to escape
or obtain a weapon if he got out of their sight;
their conduct in accompanying him into his
bedroom while he finished dressing and in observing shirt with long strands of hair resembling that of the victim which shirt and hair
were in plain sight, did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure, nor was taking
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77-7-2

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person
may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another
person.
Force which peace officer may use in making
arrest, §§ 76-2-404, 77-7-7.
Highway patrol, arrest power, § 27-10-5.
Livestock
brand
inspectors'
powers,
§ 4-24-28.
Motor Carrier Act, arrests to enforce,
§§ 54-6-44, 54-6-45.
Sheriffs power to arrest, §§ 17-22-2(l)(b).
Special police, arrest power on specified
property, §§ 67-12-4, 67-12-13.
Traffic rules and regulations, arrest for violation, § 41-6-169.
Water law, arrest powers of state engineer
and water commissioners, § 73-2-9.
Weights and measures, arrest powers of department, § 4-9-7.

History: C. 1953, 77-7-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1985, ch. 192, § 1; 1986, ch.
161, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, effective March 17, 1986, deleted "other
t h a n offenses under Title 41 where any non-jurisdictional element of the offense is" preceding "committed or attempted" in Subsection
(1).
Cross-References. — Children, grounds for
taking into custody, § 78-3a-29.
City
police
officers'
arrest
powers,
§§ 10-3-914, 10-3-915, 10-3-919.
Conservation officers' authority, §§ 23-20-1,
23-20-1.5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Arrest without warrant.
—Misdemeanor.
Authority to sign complaint.
False imprisonment.
Instructions.
"Public offense."
Reasonable cause.
Seizure of goods in making arrest.
Cited.
Arrest without warrant.
Police officers were authorized to make a
warrantless arrest of defendant for violation of
parole occasioned by association with known
felons and attempted flight to avoid arrest
where the officers had been notified by a reliable informant of the location of a house trailer
containing an escaped prison convict and other
parolees, defendant was identified as a parolee
by an officer at the scene and was observed to
make several trips into the trailer, and when
the officers ordered the occupants of the trailer
to surrender, the defendant came out, sounded
the horn on his automobile in an attempt to
alert the other occupants of the trailer, and
attempted to drive away. State v. Kent, 665
P.2d 1317 (Utah 1983).
Officers had probable cause to arrest based
on controlled buys of narcotics which had been
conducted prior to the search. State v. Banks,
720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986).

—Misdemeanor.
Officer could not legally make arrest without
warrant for "good cause" in misdemeanor cases
unless offense was committed or attempted in
his presence, and arrest was made immediately or within reasonable time thereafter.
Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P.23
(1926).
Plea of guilty to misdemeanor did not legalize unlawful arrest without warrant nor bar
action against arresting officer for false imprisonment, if offense was not committed in officer's presence or arrest was not made immediately or within reasonable time. Oleson v.
Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23 (1926).
Authority to sign complaint.
District judge imprqperly dismissed complaint signed by officer other than arresting
officer since this section deals only with the
subject of making arrest and not with filing of
complaints and is not, therefore, authority for
proposition that only arresting officer has authority to sign complaint. Salt Lake City v.
Hanson, 19 Utah 2d 32, 425 P.2d 773 (1967).
False i m p r i s o n m e n t .
If a sheriff in making an arrest was not able
to justify the same under some of the provisions of this section, it was false and unlawful,
and he was liable in a civil action for false imprisonment. Johnson v. Leigh, 74 Utah 286,
279 P. 501 (1929).
A peace officer would not necessarily be held
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ARREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE
Section
77-7-15.
77-7-16.
77-7-17.
77-7-18.
77-7-19.

Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect — Grounds.
Authority of peace officer to frisk
suspect for dangeTous weapon —
Grounds.
Authority of peace officer to take
possession of weapons.
Citation on misdemeanor or infraction charge.
Appearance before magistrate —
Failure to appear — Transfer of
cases — Motor vehicle violations.

77-7-2

Section
77-7-20. Service of citation on defendant —
Filing in court — Contents of citations.
77-7-21. Proceeding on citation — Voluntary
forfeiture of bail — Information,
when required.
77-7-22. Failure to appear as misdemeanor.
77-7-23. Delivery of prisoner arrested without warrant to magistrate —
Transfer to court with jurisdiction
— Violation as misdemeanor.

77-7-1. "Arrest" defined — Restraint allowed.
An arrest is an actual restraint of the person arrested or submission to
custody. The person shall not be subjected to any more restraint than is necessary for his arrest and detention.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. — Legislators privileged
from arrest, exceptions, Utah Const. Art. VI,
§ 8.
National Guard members privileged from arrest at certain times, exceptions, § 39-1-54.

State guard, exemption from arrest while on
duty, exceptions, § 39-4-12.
Unlawful
detention
a
misdemeanor,
§ 76-5-304.
Voters privileged from arrest on election
day, exceptions, Utah Const. Art. IV, § 3.
Witnesses obeying summons not subject to
arrest, § 77-21-5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
What constitutes "arrest."
An arrest could not be made without the
presence of an intention on the part of the arresting officer to make the arrest; notice of arrest should have been given, either expressly
or by implication, and without such notice no

amount of physical restraint could constitute
an arrest. State v. Beckendorf, 79 Utah 360,10
P.2d 1073 (1932).
An arrest must have been made in the manner authorized by law. Wright v. Lee, 104 Utah
90, 138 P 2 d 246 (1943).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Comment, Arrest
Record Expungement — A Function of the
Criminal Court, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 381.
Note: Detention, Arrest, and Salt Lake City
Police Practices, 9 Utah L. Rev. 593.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 1 et
seq.
C.J.S. — 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 1 et seq.
Key N u m b e r s . — Arrest «=» 1 et seq.

77-7-2. By peace officers.
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of
any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical
sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has
committed it;
451
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DOCKET INFORMATION;
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be
Chrg: DUI
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be
Chrg: HIT&RUN DAMAGE
Sentence:
Deft present with Counse 1, Prosecutor present
ATD: PETRO, MICHAEL
PRO: BERKOVICH, EDWARD
Tape: 931186
Count: 4577
Judge:; Joseph I. Dimick
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be
Chrg: DUI
1000.00
Suspended:
.00
Fine Amount:
Suspended:
Jail:
180 DAYS
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be
Chrg HIT&RUN DAMAGE
1000.00
Suspended:
.00
Fine Amount:
Suspended:
Jail:
180 DAYS
ALL PARTIES PRESENT. TRIAL HELD AND DEF FOUND GUILTY AS CHARGED
ON BOTH COUNTS. FINE OF $10 00 AND 180 DAYS ON EACH .COUNT STAYED
PENDING OUTCOME OF APPEAL.

JUDGE
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT.
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Orem Dept. - 4th Circuit Court
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF OREM CITY
VS
HENRIE, KARI B
1000 N 185 W
OREM

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

UT

84057

CASE NO:
DOB:
TAPE:
DATE:

935000053
02/27/62
931186COUNT: 4577
05/24/93

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 41-6-44 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: Guilty - Bench
Fine:
1000.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail: 180 DA
Susp:
0
ACS:

0

Charge: 41-6-30 FAIL TO REMAIN SCENE OF ACC-DAMAGE
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: Guilty - Bench
Fine:
1000.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail: 180 DA
Susp:
0

0

ACS:

FEES AND ASSESSMENTS:
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
Fine Description: Surcharge - 85%
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
Fine Description: Surcharge - 35%
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS:
Credit:
0.00 Paid:

0.00

Due:

1,281.30

0.00

Due:

459.45

0.00

Due:

259.25

0.00

Due:

2,000.00

